TORTS-MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE-INFORMED

CONSENT IS MEA-

SURED BY AN OBJECTIVE PRUDENT PATIENT STANDARD-Largey

v. Rothman, 110 NJ. 204, 540 A.2d 504 (1988).
The right to decide whether a medical procedure will be permitted is not a novel jurisprudential concept.' The doctrine of
informed consent is premised on the notion of individual autonomy and on the right of every human being to control their own
destiny.2 Informed consent is a specific category of liability, dis3
tinct from the traditional medical malpractice cause of action.
Under informed consent principles, it is intolerable for a physician to simply procure a patient's general consent before commencing the proposed treatment. 4 In order to render an
informed consent, a patient must acquire a fair and reasonable
grasp of the material facts involved in the intended treatment.5
In deciding cases involving informed consent, courts have
1 See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus The Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 236 (1973).
The Supreme Court has held that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interferences of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1973).
2 See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified on other
grounds, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). The court observed in Natanson:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his
own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the
performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his own
judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.
Nathanson, 186 Kan. at 406-07, 350 P.2d at 1104.
3 See LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So.2d 1039 (La. 1983); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa.
Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971). In Cooper, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
differentiated between the traditional malpractice suit, where the issue involves the
physician's failure to conform to accepted medical practice, and informed consent
cases, where the issue is whether the patient effectively agreed to a prescribed treatment. Cooper, 220 Pa. Super. at 268, 286 A.2d at 651. In informed consent cases,
the doctor-patient relationship is governed by fiduciary obligations and a patient
may possess a cause of action regardless of whether the treatment is successful. Id.
4 See generally 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § 187 (1981)
(effective consent premised on patient's understanding of contemplated
procedure).
5 See 2 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, § 22.01 at 22-7
(1988) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter LOUISELL & WILLIAMS]. In informed consent cases a plaintiff is generally required to prove that the physician failed to disclose a material risk, that the risk would have been an important consideration in
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traditionally applied the professional standard, which limits the
scope of a physician's duty to reveal those risks which physicians
customarily disclose within the medical community.6 Due to the
paternalistic nature of this standard, a number of courts have begun to apply a prudent patient standard which is based on the
patient's need for information. 7 Recently, the New Jersey
authorizing treatment, and that causation existed between the physician's failure to
disclose and the damage that the plaintiff suffered. Id.
6 See, e.g., Natanson, 186 Kan. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106 (professional standard
applied to radiologist who failed to fully inform patient of possible side-effects);
Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 492 P.2d 862 (1971) (professional standard
of review was proper to determine if woman suffering from menstrual cramps rendered an informed consent to a hysterectomy); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (where woman became pregnant after sterilization procedure, professional standard of review was used);
Brown v. Wood, 202 So.2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (professional standard
utilized to review doctor's treatment of congenital defect); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52
Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (professional standard precluded doctor's liability
for treatment resulting in patient's paralyzation); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133,
119 N.W.2d 627 (1963) (professional standard used to review disclosure to patient
who suffered an abdominal infection following operation); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va.
645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976) (professional standard employed to exonerate surgeon
who performed a hysterectomy).
7 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) (prudent patient standard used to evaluate patient's consent to a
laminectomy which resulted in paralysis); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972) (prudent patient standard was employed where patient suffered complications from ulcer operation); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp.
Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983) (a physician must advise a patient of
possible alternatives, including more hazardous options, when obtaining an informed consent under the prudent patient standard); Percle v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 349 So.2d 1289 (La. App.), cert. denied, 350 So.2d 1218 (1977)
(patient denied recovery under the prudent patient standard because a reasonably
prudent patient would have consented to the surgery); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432,
379 A.2d 1014 (1977) (prudent patient standard applied to determine whether patient gave an informed consent where the doctor failed to inform her that surgical
procedure for sterilization was not absolute); Congrove v. Homes, 37 Ohio Misc.
95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973) (prudent patient standard used to determine if patient
gave an informed consent to bi-lateral thyroidectomy which resulted in the permanent paralysis of her vocal cords); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d
647 (1971) (doctor held liable under the prudent patient standard for failing to
inform patient of risks associated with gastroscopic examination); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (radiologist held liable under prudent patient standard for failing to inform patient of risks of receiving radiation burns);
Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985) (under the prudent patient
standard, doctor had properly informed patient of the risks and alternative treatments available, prior to her undergoing amniocentesis which resulted in the death
of a viable but unborn fetus); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349
A.2d 703 (1975) (prudent patient standard utilized to determine anesthesiologist's
liability for failing to inform patient about risk of hepatitis); Miller v. Kennedy, 11
Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975)
(prudent patient standard applied to evaluate whether patient rendered an in-
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Supreme Court addressed this issue in Largey v. Rothman,8 embracing the prudent patient standard and overruling its prior acceptance of the professional standard. 9
In Largey, Dr. Glassman, while conducting an ordinary gynecological exam, discovered a mass in Mrs. Largey's right breast.'"
A mammogram verified the existence of two anomalies." Dr.
Glassman recommended that Mrs. Largey consult Dr. Rothman,
a surgeon. 12 Dr. Rothman, fearing that the anomalies might be
cancerous, suggested a biopsy.' 3 After obtaining a second opinion, Mrs. Largey agreed to allow Dr. Rothman to perform the
biopsy. 14

During the operation, Dr. Rothman excised a section of the
suspicious mass and removed several nodes, all of which were
found to be benign."' Six weeks after the biopsy, Mrs. Largey's
right arm and hand began to swell.' 6 These symptoms evidenced
a condition known as lymphedema.' 7 In preparing Mrs. Largey
for the biopsy, Dr. Rothman failed to advise her of the possible
exposure to this condition."
At trial, a dispute arose concerning whether Dr. Rothman
informed Mrs. Largey that the operation would encompass the
formed consent where the doctor failed to advise of the risks and alternatives available before performing a kidney biopsy); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va.
1982) (where patient had signed a general consent form which failed to indicate
that surgery would be performed, doctor held liable, under the prudent patient
standard, for performing a transurethral resection of the prostate gland); Scaria v.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis.2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975) (prudent
patient standard used to ascertain patient's consent to an aortogram which resulted
in paralysis). See generally 5 PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 at 191
(1984) (a number of recent cases define the duty of disclosure in terms of the patient's need for information).
8 110 N.J. 204, 540 A.2d 504 (1988) (per curiam).
9 Id. at 206, 540 A.2d at 505.
10 Id.
I I Id. Further examination revealed "an 'ill-defined density' in the subareola re-

gion and an enlarged lymph node or nodes, measuring four-by-two centimeters, in
the right axilla (armpit)." Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 206-07, 540 A.2d at 505.
14 Id. at 207, 540 A.2d at 505.
15 Id. Dr. Rothman testified, at trial, that he originally believed that only a single
node needed to be removed, but during the course of the biopsy he actually removed five nodes. Appellant's Brief at 19, Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 540
A.2d 504 (1988) (No. A-1999-84T6).
16 Largey, 110 N.J. at 207, 540 A.2d at 505.
17 Id. Lymphedema is "swelling caused by inadequate drainage in the lymphatic
system. The condition results from the excision of the lymph nodes." Id.
18 Id.
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removal of not only breast tissue, but of lymph nodes as well.' 9
Mrs. Largey's experts testified that the doctor should have informed her of the risk of lymphedema. 20 Dr. Rothman's experts,
on the other hand, maintained that the risk of lymphedema
was
2'
patient.
a
to
disclosure
warrant
to
improbable
too
During the trial, Mrs. Largey contended that she did not
consent to having her lymph nodes removed.2 2 Furthermore, she
testified that even if she had consented, her consent was ineffective because her doctor failed to warn her of the risks associated
with the removal of lymph nodes. 23 Despite her testimony, the
jury determined that Mrs. Largey had been given sufficient information from which to make an informed decision 24 and there25
fore, found in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial court's
decision in an unreported opinion. 2 ' The appellate court noted
that the jury had been charged with the correct standard of informed consent under Kaplan v. Haines, 7 the then existing law in
New Jersey.28
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition
for certification 29 to determine the appropriate standard to be
applied in informed consent cases.3 0 The court, in a per curiam
opinion, discarded the Kaplan professional standard and adopted
19 Id.
20 Id.

21
22

Id.
Id.

23 Id. Mrs. Largey advanced two alternative theories of liability. Id. She contended that either Dr. Rothman committed a battery by operating on an area of her
body without her consent (removing her lymph nodes), or he failed to obtain her
informed consent. Id. Mrs. Largey's husband also brought a per quod claim against
Dr. Rotherman. Id.
24 Id. In response to specific interrogatories, the jury determined that, "defendant ha[d] not 'fail[ed] to provide Janice Largey with sufficient information so that
she could give informed consent' for the operative procedure." Id. at 205, 540
A.2d at 504.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 205-06, 540 A.2d at 505.
27 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 404, 241
A.2d 235 (1968).
28 Largey, 110 N.J. at 205-06, 540 A.2d at 505. The appellate division did not
reject the prudent patient standard announced in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), but determined that it was confined by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Kaplan. Largey, 110 N.J. at
206, 540 A.2d at 505.
29 104 N.J. 415, 517 A.2d 413 (1986).
30 Largey, 110 N.J. at 206, 540 A.2d at 505.
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the prudent patient standard announced in Canterbury v. Spence. 3 1
After determining the correct standard of review in informed
consent cases, the supreme court reversed the appellate court's
32
decision and remanded the case for a new trial.
To fully understand the impact of Largey, it is critical to understand the evolution of the doctrine of informed consent. Traditionally, the consent issue has relied on the principles of assault
and battery,3 3 trespass,3 4 and negligence. 5 Over two centuries
ago, in Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 36 an English court set forth the
basis for the present doctrine of informed consent. 37 In Slater,
the defendants improperly set plaintiff's broken leg which caused
it to heal crookedly 8 Contrary to plaintiff's wishes, the defendants unanimously agreed that they would be able to straighten
plaintiff's leg by performing a leg extension procedure.3 9 Plaintiff's expert, however, testified at trial that compression was the
proper technique and that the process of extension was improper
and should not have been performed without plaintiff's consent.4" The jury found the defendants guilty of acting "ignorantly and unskillfully, contrary to the known rule and usage of
surgeons."'" The court secured the underpinnings for the present day doctrine of informed consent when it enunciated that "it
is reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be
done to him." 4 2
The landmark case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospi31 Id. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).
32 Largey, 110 N.J. at 206, 540 A.2d at 505.
33 See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) (plaintiff sued
for assault where doctor performed surgery on infected left ear after having diagnosed only the right ear); Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983) (battery claim applied where a patient did not consent to a particular medical
procedure).
34 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 360, 90 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1956)
(where medical treatment was entirely unauthorized, the treatment resulted in a
trespass to the person).
35 See, e.g., Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 191, 473 P.2d 116, 118-19 (1970)
(where a medical procedure involved an undisclosed ancillary danger, the claim was
grounded in negligence because the issue centered around the neglect of a physician's duty in his dealing with the patient).
36 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
37 Id. at 862.
38 Id. at 861.
39 Id. This procedure entailed rebreaking plaintiff's leg in order to reset the
fracture properly. Id.
40 Id. at 862.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 862.
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tal,4 3 was the leading decision on informed consent in the United
States. In Schloendorff, plaintiff entered the hospital suffering
from an unknown stomach ailment.4 4 Dr. Bartlett, a staff physician, discovered a lump in her stomach and recommended that
she undergo an examination.4 5 The plaintiff conditioned her
consent on the doctor's agreement not to operate. 4 6 During the
examination and while the plaintiff was unconscious, the doctor
removed a fibroid tumor. 47 The plaintiff sued the hospital, claiming that the operation was performed without her knowledge or
48
consent.
Writing for the majority in Schloendorff, Justice Cardozo recognized the plaintiff's right to recover for an unauthorized operation.4 9 Justice Cardozo declared that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages."' 50 Justice Cardozo's opinion relied on trespass principles and on the patient's unfettered right
to determine what should be done with his body.5 '
Although the doctrine of consent is long standing, the concept of informed consent is relatively modern.5 2 Contemporary
analysis of the informed consent doctrine began with the case of
Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. University Board of Trustees.53 In Salgo,
the California District Court of Appeal recognized that the consent doctrine was a matter of professional standards, and there43

211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).

44 Id. at 127, 105 N.E. at 93.
45 Id. at 127-28, 105 N.E. at 93.
46 Id. at 128, 105 N.E. at 93.
47

Id. Frequently found in the uterine wall, a fibroid tumor is a benign tumor

consisting of fibrous and muscular tissue. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

425 (1977).
48 Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 128, 105 N.E. at 93.
49 Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93. At the time Schloendorff was written justice Cardozo was a member of the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 125, 105 N.E. at 92.
50 Id.
51 Id. Justice Cardozo's determination in Schloendorff that a person has an absolute right to decide what should be done with his body has become the benchmark
of the informed consent doctrine. See, e.g., Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 207,
540 A.2d 504, 505 (1988) (stating that as a result of Schloendorff, the doctrine of
informed consent is well-embedded in our law); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (referring to Schloendorff as the fundamental premise of
informed consent); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 439, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (1977)
(attributing Schloendorff as the fountainhead of the informed consent doctrine).
52 Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 208, 540 A.2d 504, 506 (1988).
53 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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fore, was essentially a negligence concept.5 4 Additionally, the
55
court recognized that consent must be informed to be effective.
In Salgo, the plaintiff suffered from severe leg cramps which
caused him to limp periodically.5 6 Dr. Gerbode examined the
plaintiff and recommended that he undergo a comprehensive examination at the Stanford University Hospital.5 7 Upon completion of the hospital examination, Dr. Gerbode informed the
plaintiff that his ailment apparently ensued from an obstruction
in his abdominal aorta and that the obstruction caused severe circulatory disturbances.5 8 To rectify the ailment, Dr. Gerbode recommended that plaintiff undergo an aortography.5 9 Despite the
fact that the examination had appeared to have progressed properly, 60 the next morning the plaintiff discovered that he was paralyzed from the waist down. 6 '
At trial, Dr. Gerbode claimed that he informed plaintiff that
an aortography was to be performed, however, he admitted that
he did not disclose what the procedure entailed or the possible
risks related with the procedure. 6 2 The California Court of Appeal perceived that "[a] physician violates his duty to his patient
and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the pa54

Id. at 570, 317 P.2d at 176.

Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
Id. at 564, 317 P.2d at 172-73. Plaintiff had originally consulted his personal
physician approximately two to three years earlier when he first noticed cramping
in his legs. Id. at 564, 317 P.2d at 172. Plaintiff also suffered from an "eye condition indicating premature aging." Id. These factors ultimately led plaintiff's physician to refer him to Dr. Gerbode, "a specialist in the surgical treatment of arterial
diseases." Id.
57 Id. at 565, 317 P.2d at 173. Dr. Gerbode's initial examination revealed a man
who appeared much older than his actual age. Id. Both of the plaintiff's calves and
thighs showed signs of deterioration and his right leg was blue. Id. Dr. Gerbode
diagnosed plaintiff's condition as arteriosclerosis with a possible occlusion of the
abdominal aorta which impaired the supply of blood to his limbs. Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 566, 317 P.2d at 173. This procedure entailed receiving an anesthetic
and the injection of a radio-opaque dye into the aorta which would disclose the
blocked area. Id. An x-ray of plaintiff's gastrointestinal tract was also taken to assist in evaluating his condition. Id.
60 Id. at 567, 317 P.2d at 173: The x-rays, which illuminated the vascular tree,
indicated a blockage in the descending aorta just below the kidneys. Id. at 566, 317
P.2d at 174. According to ordinary practice and while the plaintiff remained unconscious, doctors Stone, Ellis and Andrews, the staff doctors who performed the
aortography, injected a second dose of the radio-opaque material to establish the
exact extent of the obstruction. Id. at 569, 317 P.2d at 319.
61 Id. at 568, 317 P.2d at 174-75. Plaintiff's paralysis was permanent. Id.at 568,
317 P.2d at 175.
62 Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
55
56
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tient to the proposed treatment. "63 The court, however, reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the
jury instruction failed to recognize that a physician also has discretion consistent with the principle of complete disclosure.64
The Kansas case of Natanson v. Kline65 further developed the
informed consent doctrine, establishing the professional standard for reviewing disclosure. In Natanson, plaintiff employed a
radiologist to perform cobalt radiation therapy to the area surrounding a mastectomy.6 6 As a result of the cobalt therapy, the
plaintiff's "entire chest, skin, cartilage and bone were completely
destroyed" in the area of treatment. 67 At trial, the radiologist
admitted that he knew the use of the cobalt irradiation involved a
calculated risk. 68 Despite having acknowledged this risk, the radiologist failed to inform the plaintiff of any possible dangers associated with the therapy.69 The state's highest court determined
that, in a suit based on informed consent, the fundamental basis
of a physician's duty to disclose is limited to that information
which a reasonable and prudent medical practitioner would have
disclosed under similar circumstances.7 °
The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the professional
63 Id. The court recognized that disclosure often places the doctor in a position
where he must choose between competing interests. Id. The doctor could inform
the patient of every possible risk attendant with a given means of treatment which
may result in alarming his patient and actually increasing certain risks. Id. Alternatively, the doctor could make disclosures recognizing that every patient is unique
and that a patient's emotional and mental condition must be weighed in determining what risks need to be disclosed to allow the patient to make an informed decision. Id.
64 Id. at 578-79, 170 P.2d at 181-82.
65 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modifiedon other grounds, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
670 (1960).
66 186 Kan. at 394, 350 P.2d at 1095. The purpose of undergoing irradiation
therapy is to destroy any remaining cancerous tissue. Id. at 395, 350 P.2d at 1096.
The theory is that the normal tissue can recover and survive a series of radiation
doses while the more vulnerable cancerous tissue will be obliterated. Id. Cobalt is
preferred over X-ray irradiation because of the Cobalt's ability to penetrate deeper
into the skin with less risk of injury. Id.
67 Id. at 397, 350 P.2d at 1097. Dr. Kline ordered a tumor dose which directed
the treatment to the depth of the tumor. Id. at 395, 350 P.2d at 1096. In contrast
an equilibrium dose directs treatment to a maximum of five millimeters below the
surface of the skin. Id. Plaintiff's expert calculated that plaintiff's injuries resulted
from the application of equilibrium doses delivered to various sections of the chest
wall. Id. at 397, 350 P.2d at 1097.
68 Id. at 401, 350 P.2d at 1100.
69

Id.

Id. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106. As a result of the professional standard, the
plaintiff was required to employ expert witnesses to establish the existence of a
community standard and the doctor's failure to meet that standard. See Natanson v.
70
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standard of review in Kaplan v. Haines."' In Kaplan, the plaintiff
experienced pain in her lower back which radiated down her left
leg.7" On the doctor's recommendation, the plaintiff entered the
hospital where she was placed in traction and underwent a fluor73
oscopic examination and a myelogram.
After traction proved unsuccessful, the doctor informed the
plaintiff that there was a good chance that surgery would relieve
the pain. 4 Plaintiff testified that she consented to an operation
to remove a herniated disc. 75 During surgery, the doctor discovered that the disc was not ruptured.7 6 Dr. Haines, however,
found a mass that he believed was responsible for the pain in her
leg.7 7 Dr. Haines proceeded to perform a spinal fusion of the
pelvic bone and the last vertebra removing the unknown mass. 78
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410-11, 354 P.2d 1093, 1106-07, modified on other grounds, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 678 (1960).
71 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 404, 241
A.2d 235 (1968).
72 Kaplan, 96 N.J. Super. at 246, 232 A.2d at 842. The source of plaintiff's pain
appeared to emanate from an injured coccyx (the end of the vertebral column,
commonly known as the tailbone). Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 247, 232 A.2d at 842. The doctor contended that he explained to Mrs.
Kaplan:
The things I have done to help you have not helped you. We have now
arrived at the point where you have a choice to make. You have the
choice of continuing with this pain, adjust your life to it with a brace or
corset, it may be able to help it a little, but since the traction didn't help
and since the traction immobilized the back, and since the effect of a
brace is to immobilize the back, the brace doesn't offer much likelihood
of helping either, and if you feel this pain is the type of pain that you can
live with and adjust your life to, well, then, that's what you ought to do.
If you feel it is the kind of a pain that you cannot consider enduring for
day after day and month after month, then there is a fairly good chance
that an operation would relieve at least a good part of this pain.
Id.
75 Id. Plaintiff stated that after ten days of traction, without any change in her
condition, the doctor told her that a myelogram indicated that a damaged disc was
pressing on a nerve and that he was of the opinion that an operation was imperative
or she would run the risk of paralysis. Id. at 248, 232 A.2d 843.
76 Id. at 247, 232 A.2d 842.
77 Id.
78 Id. A laboratory examination of the mass indicated a "[flibroelastic cartilage
varying in staining quality suggesting degenerative change." Id. at 247-48, 232
A.2d at 843. Approximately one month after the surgery, a staphylococcus infection materialized at the point of the incision. Id. at 248, 232 A.2d at 843. Due to
the infection spreading into the underlying bone graft, the doctor performed a second operation. Id. After the operation, plaintiff still experienced pain and was restricted in her movement. Id. at 248, 232 A.2d at 843. At the time of the trial, she
remained under the continuing care of Dr. James Nixon, an orthopedic surgeon.
Id. at 249, 232 A.2d at 843.
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The plaintiff alleged that the doctor performed an unauthorized
operation for which he had not obtained her informed consent.7 9
Dr. Haines asserted that the plaintiff expressed a desire to have
the operation preformed if there was a good chance of relieving
her pain. s° In addition, Dr. Haines testified that he explained the
spinal fusion procedure to the plaintiff's husband before he proceeded with the operation. 8
The appellate court upheld the lower court's jury charge,
which stated that "[t]he standard that must be followed by an
orthopedic specialist in performing his duty is that he must make
such disclosure as a reasonable orthopedic specialist would make
faced with the same or similar circumstances. ' 82 On appeal, the
supreme court upheld the professional standard employed by the
trial court.8"
In 1972, four years after New Jersey adopted the professional standard, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals announced a new standard of informed consent in the
landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence. 84 In Canterbury, the plaintiff
suffered from excessive pain between his shoulder blades.8 5 Dr.
Spence diagnosed the condition as a ruptured
disc and advised
86
the defendant to submit to a laminectomy.
The plaintiff was nineteen years old at the time of the operation, and therefore, the doctor consulted the plaintiff's mother.8 7
The plaintiff's mother testified that when she inquired into the
seriousness of her son's operation, the doctor replied, "not any79 Id. at 250, 232 A.2d at 844. Dr. Nixon, testifying on behalf of the plaintiff,
maintained that it was not sufficient for the plaintiff to realize that she was to undergo a risky procedure. Id. Dr. Nixon contended that it was essential for the patient to be informed of the possible adverse effects of the surgery. Id.
80 Id. at 247, 232 A.2d at 842. At trial, four orthopedic surgeons, testifying on
behalf of Dr. Haines, determined that his explanation of the proposed operation
was in compliance with the commonly accepted standards of orthopedic procedure
and practice, and therefore, his disclosure was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to
make an informed consent. Id. at 250, 232 A.2d at 844.
81 Id. at 247, 232 A.2d at 842.
82 Id. at 255-56, 232 A.2d at 847.
83 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968). The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the decision of the lower court for substantially the same reasons
stated by the appellate division. Id.
84 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
85 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776.
86 Id. at 777. The doctor informed the plaintiff that the procedure involved removing "the posterior arch of the vertebra." Id.
87 Id. at 776-77. Dr. Spence first contacted plaintiff's mother the day after a
myelogram had already been performed and told her that he proposed surgery to
alleviate a suspected ruptured disc. Id.
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more than any other operation." 8 8 Dr. Spence admitted, however, that paralysis can occur approximately one percent of the
time when performing a laminectomy.8 9 The doctor determined
that the risk was slight, and consequently, he did not inform the
plaintiff of the possibility of paralysis. 90 During the operation,
the laminectomy disclosed several anomalies. 9 ' The day after the
operation, the plaintiff experienced paralysis from the waist
down.92
The Canterbury court rejected the professional standard of review, determining that the duty to disclose arises from the patient's right of self-determination and from the patient's need for
material facts required to make an informed decision.93 The
court stated that "[a] risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position," would conceivably attach importance to the
potential exposure in deciding whether or not to undergo the
proposed treatment. 94 The court also determined that a physician's liability for nondisclosure must be ascertained by applying
an objective standard predicated on "what a prudent person in
the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of
88 Id.
89 Id.

at 777.
at 778.

90 Id.

91 Id. at 777. The laminectomy revealed a swollen spinal cord which was incapable of pulsating, the omission of epidural fat that ordinarily encompasses the spine,
and a compilation of enlarged and damaged veins. Id. The doctor injected a needle "into the spinal cord to aspirate any cysts which might have been present, but
no fluid emerged." Id. Dr. Spence also enlarged the protective wall of the spine in
the swollen region to alleviate tension on the spinal cord. Id.
92 Id. A second operation was performed in which defendant reopened the incision to create a gusset permitting the spinal cord a larger area in which to pulse. Id.
Notwithstanding further treatment, plaintiff required the assistance of crutches and
suffered paralysis of the bowels and urinal incontinence. Id. at 778.
93 Id. at 783, 786.
94 Id. at 787. The court recognized a number of situations where disclosure is
not necessary. Id. at 788-89 (citing Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d
627 (1963)) (no obligation to communicate risks which are commonly understood
or obvious to a person of average intelligence); Fleishman v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 94 N.J. Super. 90, 226 A.2d 843 (App. Div. 1967) (no duty to disclose where
the risks are already known by the patient); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 640 (1970) (where risks have no apparent materiality to patient's decision disclosure is not necessary); Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d
940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1970) (applying Pennsylvania law) (disclosure not necessary in
emergency situation where the patient is incapable of consenting and immediate
treatment is necessary); Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962)
(no duty to disclose where the disclosure presents a threat to the patient's recovery,
recognizing the physician's privilege in situations where the information is likely to
complicate or impede the treatment and possibly cause psychological damage).
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all perils being significant." 95
Recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided Largey v.
Rothman,96 to resolve discord among the state's lower courts.
Before Largey, some lower courts employed Canterbury's analysis
to informed consent issues.9 7 Other courts, however, specifically
rejected Canterbury and continued to apply the professional standard of review. 9 8
The Largey court began its analysis by limiting the scope of
its review to the determination of the correct standard to apply in
informed consent cases. 9 9 In analyzing the underlying principles
of the informed consent doctrine, the court traced the doctrine's
evolutionary path.' 0 0 The court initially observed that the origin
of the physician's duty to obtain a patient's consent before treatment was established over two centuries ago in England' 0 ' and is
now embedded in our law.'0 2
The court further observed that although the notion that a
patient must give consent prior to receiving any treatment is long
standing, the principles of informed consent are of relatively re95 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791. The court was wary of a standard that effectively
allowed physicians to regulate themselves. id. at 783-84. The court perceived of
situations where no observable custom, indicating a professional consensus of what
constituted a reasonable disclosure, might exist. Id. The court also opined that
allowing the physician to act as a conduit, censoring what information he feels a
patient would deem important, runs against the time honored concept of the patient's right of self-determination. Id. at 784.
The court further determined that in most nondisclosure cases expert medical
testimony will not be necessary because lay persons can establish that a physician
failed to disclose particular information and that adverse consequences resulted
from the treatment. Id. at 792.
96 110 N.J. 204, 540 A.2d 504 (1988) (per curiam).
97 See, e.g., Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 432 (1983) (prudent patient
analysis was employed where patient consented to surgery by one doctor, but surgery was actually performed by another); Skripek v. Bergamo, 200 N.J. Super. 620,
491 A.2d 1336 (App. Div. 1985), cert. denied, 102 N.J. 303, 508 A.2d 189 (1985)
(reasonably prudent patient standard used where plaintiff claimed that risks of
breast surgery were not fully disclosed).
98 See, e.g., Cheung v. Cunningham, 214 N.J. Super. 649, 520 A.2d 832 (App.
Div. 1987) (court repudiated prudent patient standard and required proof that patient would not have consented to surgery if full disclosure was made); Calabrese v.
Trenton State College, 162 N.J. Super. 145, 392 A.2d 600 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd,
82 N.J. 315, 413 A.2d 315 (1980) (professional standard used to determine if patient was adequately informed of risks inherent in rabies vaccine).
99 Largey, 110 N.J. at 206, 540 A.2d at 505.
100 Id. at 207-12, 540 A.2d at 505-08.
101 Id. at 207, 540 A.2d at 505. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text
(discussing Slater, a 1767 King's Bench decision).
102 Largey, 110 N.J. at 207, 540 A.2d at 505. See also supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Schloendorff opinion).
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cent development. 103 The court emphasized that the doctrine is
essentially a negligence concept, based upon a physician's duty
to inform a patient of the risks associated with a proposed form
of treatment.10 4 The court further stated that the physician's
duty also includes the responsibility to disclose any possible al10 5
ternative treatments that are available to the patient.
The supreme court noted that an early expression of the informed consent doctrine was found in Salgo, a California Appellate Division decision. 0 6 In addition, the court noted that
Natanson developed the professional standard of informed consent. 10 7 The Largey court remarked that the professional standard was adopted twenty years earlier when the court
incorporated the informed consent doctrine into New Jersey's
08
medical malpractice proceedings.
In reassessing the professional standard, the Largey court
perceived that most jurisdictions relied on two reasons for adhering to the professional standard.'0 9 First, the court noted that
these jurisdictions believed that only physicians have the ability
to effectively estimate the psychological and physical ramifications that disclosure might produce in a patient." 0 Second, the
court noted that such jurisdictions found the prudent patient
standard too burdensome, causing physicians to waste time in reviewing every possible risk with the patient, thereby interfering
with the physician's discretion to determine what form of treat103

Largey, 110 N.J. at 208, 540 A.2d at 506.

104

Id.

Id. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-22 (1985)
(quoting Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973)) (no medical treatment may be performed unless physician has explained "the nature of the
treatment, substantial risks, and alternative therapies"); Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J.
446, 459, 457 A.2d 431, 437 (1983) (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)) (patient must be able to "evaluate
knowledgeably the options available").
106 Large,, 110 N.J. at 208, 540 A.2d at 506. See also supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (discussing the California courts' analysis in Salgo).
107 Largey, 110 N.J. at 208-09, 540 A.2d at 506. See also supra notes 65-70 and
accompanying text (an analysis of the Kansas court's decision in Natanson).
108 Largey, 110 N.J. at 210, 540 A.2d at 507. See also supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing Kaplan, where the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the
professional standard of review in informed consent cases).
109 Largey, 110 N.J. at 210, 540 A.2d at 507.
110 Id. at 210, 540 A.2d at 507. See also Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453, 458
(Alaska 1964) ("[D]octors frequently tailor the extent of their preoperative warnings to the particular patient to avoid the unnecessary anxiety and apprehension
which such appraisal might arouse in the mind of the patient.").
105
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ment is appropriate for the patient."'
The supreme court in Largey considered both of these assumptions to be flawed and inconsistent with the fundamental
notion of the informed consent doctrine." 2 After rejecting the
arguments in favor of the professional standard, the court next
addressed 3the prudent patient standard announced in
Canterbury."t

The Largey court listed four justifications for adopting the
prudent patient standard." 4 The supreme court doubted
whether a consensus could be achieved within the medical community concerning disclosure standards." t5 The court also concluded that the medical community should not provide the legal
criterion for disclosures. 1 6 Moreover, the Largey court disliked
the professional standard's dependence on the notions of physicians in a particular community." 7 Lastly, the court recognized
the "community of silence" amongst doctors which has caused
plaintiffs difficulties in finding doctors who are willing to testify
against a colleague." 8 Therefore, the Largey court concluded
that the reasons offered in support of adopting the prudent patient standard were persuasive and the policy considerations
clearly supported New Jersey's adoption of such a standard.'' 9
In addition, the court refuted the argument that adopting
the prudent patient standard would require full disclosure of immaterial and slight risks to every patient. 20 In rejecting this argument, the court adopted the language of Canterbury, which
clearly stated that 12only
"material risks to a reasonable patient"
1
must be disclosed.

111 Largey, 110 N.J. at 210, 540 A.2d at 507 (quoting Louisell & Williams, supra
§ 22.08 at 22-34) (footnotes omitted). See also Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325,
341, 213 S.E.2d 571, 581 (1975) (where the chance of an adverse result is slight,
determination of which risks a patient should be informed of is largely at the discretion of the physician).
112 Largey, 110 N.J. at 213, 540 A.2d at 509. See also Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hosp., 221 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (patient, not the physician, has
a right to determine what shall be done to his body).
113 Largey, 110 N.J. at 211, 540 A.2d at 507. See also supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Canterbury decision).
''4 Largey, 110 N.J. at 212-13, 540 A.2d at 508-09.
115 Id. at 212, 540 A.2d at 508.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 213, 540 A.2d at 509.
118 Id.
''9 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)). The Canterbury court stated that:
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The court suggested that the -strong policy considerations
along with the underlying principle that a physician's duty to disclose "arises from phenomena apart from medial custom and
practice," convinced the court that the prudent patient standard
more accurately reflects the foundation upon which the informed
consent doctrine rests. 22 The court also considered the fact that
a number of New Jersey courts have cited, with approval, Canter23
bury's propositions and rationale.
According to the Largey court, the extent of disclosure
should be based on the individual, varying from person to person
in accordance with the factual situation, and not subject to the
medical community's whim. 2 4 In subscribing to the prudent patient standard, the court specified that the breadth of risks legally
required to be disclosed must be measured by an objective standard. ' 25 The court observed that such a standard must take into
consideration the informational needs imperative for a patient to
make an informed consent as well as a physician's need to judge
particular situations. 126 The court added that a risk is material
and warrants disclosure "when a reasonable patient, in what the
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position,
would be 'likely to attach significance to the risk or clutter of
risks' in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy or to
27
submit to it.'

1

The topics importantly demanding a communication of information are
the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives of that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated. The factors contributing significance to the
dangerousness of a medical technique are, of course, the incidence of
injury and the degree of harm threatened.
Id.
122

Largey, 110 N.J. at 210-14, 540 A.2d at 507-09.

123 Id. at 214-15, 540 A.2d at 509-10 (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446,459-60,

457 A.2d 431, 438 (1983) (quoting Canterbury's pronouncement of a physician's
duty to disclose, informed consent, and material risk); Nicholl v. Reagan, 208 N.J.
Super. 644, 651, 506 A.2d 805, 809 (App. Div. 1986) (adopting Canterbury's objective standard for proximate causation); Skripek v. Bergamo, 200 NJ. Super. 620,
636-38, 491 A.2d 1336, 1345-46 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 102 N.J. 303, 508 A.2d 189
(1985) (adopting Canterbury's objective standard of establishing proximate causation in informed consent actions); Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J.
Super. 145, 392 A.2d 600 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 82 N.J. 321, 413 A.2d 315 (1980)
("the doctor's duty of disclosure is imposed by law and not by medical
consensus")).
124 Id. at 212, 540 A.2d at 508 (quoting LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5,
§ 22.12 at 22-47).
125 Id. at 216, 540 A.2d at 510.
126 Id. at 211, 540 A.2d at 508.
127 Id. at 211-12, 540 A.2d at 508 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787).
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The court concluded its analysis by discussing the issue of
proximate causation. 21 Under the prudent patient standard, the
court declared that the issue of causation must be approached
from an objective standard. 1 9 According to the court, this standard requires the plaintiff to prove that a prudent person in the
patient's position who was alerted to the risk or danger which
resulted in harm, would have declined the proposed treatment. 3 ° Stated differently, where the plaintiff was not fully informed of the material facts, but nevertheless would have
undergone the operation, the plaintiff has failed to show causa13 1
tion and may not prevail.
The doctrine of informed consent is premised on the notion
that a patient has all the facts essential to evaluate the risks and
benefits of a proposed form of treatment and information regarding all the available alternatives. 13 2 It is irrational that a doctrine based on the patient being in possession of all pertinent
information would allow the physician professional discretion to
act as a censor in determining which risks and facts they believe
128 Id. at 215, 540 A.2d at 510. In informed consent cases, not unlike traditional
medical malpractice litigation, a plaintiff is required to prove that the physician not
only failed to satisfy the relevant standard of disclosure, but also that such noncom-

pliance was the proximate cause of the injuries. See, e.g., Nicholl v. Reagan, 208 N.J.

Super. 644, 651, 506 A.2d 805, 809 (App. Div. 1986) (informed consent cases require proof that breach of duty was proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries); Skripek
v. Bergamo, 200 NJ. Super. 620, 636-38, 491 A.2d 1336, 1345-46 (App. Div.), cert.
denied, 102 N.J. 303, 508 A.2d 189 (1985) (there must be a causal relationship established between physician's breach of duty and patient's injury).
129 Largey, 110 N.J. at 216, 540 A.2d at 510.
130 Id. at 216, 540 A.2d at 510 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791). In rejecting
the application of a subjective standard to prove causation, the court in Canterbury
stated that:
A subjective standard places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's
hindsight and bitterness. It places the fact-finder in the position of deciding whether a speculative answer to a hypothetical question is to be
credited. It calls for a subjective determination solely on testimony of a
patient-witness shadowed by the occurrence of the undisclosed risk.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91.
The Largey court specifically noted that the appellate division erred when it
applied this subjective standard in Cheung v. Cunningham, 214 N.J. Super. 649,
654, 520 A.2d 832, 834-35 (App. Div. 1987). But see In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 36061, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985) ("The standard we are enunciating is a subjective
one.... The question is not what a reasonable or average person would have done
under the circumstances but what the particular patient would have done if able to
choose for himself.").
131 Largey, 110 N.J. at 215-16, 540 A.2d at 510 (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J.
446, 460 n.2, 457 A.2d 431, 438 n.2 (1983)).
132 Largey, 110 N.J. at 214, 540 A.2d 509 (quoting In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347,
486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985)).
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the patient needs to know. This unbridled professional discretion transgresses the core objective of the informed consent doctrine, the patient's unfettered right to determine what will be
1 33
done with his body.
It is illogical to conclude that a patient has given an informed
consent when, due to the physician's exercise of discretion, the
patient does not possess all the relevant information necessary to
make an informed choice.134 The Largey court recognized that "it
is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine
' 35
for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie."'
The Largey court surmised that to permit the standard of disclosure to be governed by the surrounding medical community
would be tantamount to allowing the fox to guard the henhouse.
By adopting the prudent patient standard, the court removed the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating through expert
testimony an existing standard of disclosure amongst the medical
community. 136 In addition, the court acknowledged the community of silence which exists in the medical community.' 3 ' Both of
these factors substantially impeded an injured plaintiff from
bringing suit against a physician under the professional standard
of review.
The court also recognized that the prudent patient standard
might cause an onslaught of informed consent litigation.' 3 The
court, however, safeguarded against frivolous suits by specifically
39
adopting the Canterbury materiality and proximate causation
requirements. Under Largey, a plaintiff must prove that nondisclosed information would be significant to a reasonable patient in
deciding whether or not to undergo a proposed treatment. 4 0 By
133

See supra notes 2, 51 and 52.

134 See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972). The
court in Cobbs stated that "unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable

with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed decision regarding
the course of treatment to which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected." Id.
at 243, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514, 502 P.2d at 10. See also Wilkinson v. Vessey, 110 R.I.
606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). The Wilkinson court determined that "blind adherence
to local practice is completely at odds with the undisputed right of the patient to
receive information which will enable him to make a choice." Id. at 625, 295 A.2d
at 688.
135 Largey, 110 N.J. at 214, 540 A.2d at 509 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781).
136 See id. at 213, 540 A.2d at 509 (citing LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5,
§ 22.12 at 22-47).
137 See id. See also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
138 See Largey, 110 N.J. at 216, 540 A.2d at 510.
139 Id. at 213, 540 A.2d at 509.
140 Id. at 215-16, 540 A.2d at 510-11 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791).
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also adopting an objective standard, the court protects physicians
against frivolous suits by patients who were reasonably informed,
but nonetheless claim they would have forgone the operation if
they knew additional information.
The safeguards set forth in Largey provide a balanced approach to informed consent cases. The patient is entitled to an
undiluted standard of informed consent viewed from the patient's perspective and protected from the whims of a perceived
medical community standard. At the same time, physicians are
assured that they will not be unjustly held liable based on a "patient's hindsight and bitterness." 14 ' The court's decision in
Largey also recognized a physician's
limited need for discretion
4 2
when diagnosing each patient. 1
The prudent patient standard set forth in Largey did not
abolish a physician's discretion when treating a patient, the standard merely circumscribes that right. 143 This standard places primary focus on the patient's right to receive information. 144 Thus,
it seems that the objective of the prudent patient standard is to
make a physician's discretion to withhold information the exception and not the general rule.
The Largey court, in adopting the prudent patient standard,
has succinctly captured the essence of Justice Cardozo's pronouncement that "[e]very human being ... has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."' 45 Thus, true
informed consent appears to be a reality in New Jersey.
DouglasJ. Olcott
141 Id. at 216, 540 A.2d 510 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791).
142

See id. at 213, 540 A.2d at 509. See also supra note 94.

143 Largey, 110 N.J. at 214, 540 A.2d at 509.
144 Id.
145

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

